TORTS II OUTLINE
I. VICARIOUS LIABILITY - search for deep pockets. Impose liability on one party for the actions of another: derivatively imposed.
Two ways to get the principle - vicarious liability action and negligence action.
A. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Respondeat Superior Doctrine - employers are liable for the negligence of an employee committed while the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. An employee acts in the scope of his employment when he is doing something in furtherance of the duties he owes to his employer and where the employer is, or could be, exercising some control, directly or indirectly, over the employee's activities.
1. Commuting to and from work is not under this doctrine.
2. Traveling during work is under this doctrine. Minor detours generally are within the scope of employment. Frolics (goes to see mistress 30 miles away -no vicarious liability).
3. An employee who uses his car during the course of his work (traveling salesman) is acting in the scope of employment while driving home from his last business appointment - since such a person is working and under his employer's control from the time he leaves his house.
4. Lundberg v. State. Engineering technician was not acting in the scope of his employment when he was involved in a traffic accident on the way from his weekend home in Buffalo to his work-site 80 miles away.
5. Distinguish workers' compensation claim (job related) vs. scope of employment for vicarious liability. The former is broader, making it easier to obtain workers' compensation.
6. INTENTIONAL TORTS - normally held not within the scope of employment. Exceptions for intent. tort liability to employer:
a) Force is authorized in the employment, e.g., bouncer
b) Friction is generated in the employment, e.g., bill collector
c) Employee is furthering employer's interest, e.g., removing a rowdy customer.
B. WHY HAVE VICARIOUS LIABILITY?
1. Control/deterrence. Employer is in a better position to prevent negligence?
2. Compensation.
3. Risk allocation / spread costs/risks - rather than leaving damage all on victim.
4. Enterprise (cost of doing business). Enterprise benefits, therefore it should pay the costs.
C. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
1. Employers are generally not liable for the torts of independent contractors. An independent contractor is one who engages to perform a certain service for another according to his own methods and manner, free from control and direction of his employer in all matters connected with the performance of the service except as to the result thereof.
2. The parties agree that the decisive test for determining whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the physical details of the work. Murrell v. Goertz (Newspaper delivery contractor held not to be an employee of the newspaper. He had no direct contact with the newspaper and was hired by another contractor.)
Other factors to distinguish employee from indep. contractor:
whether one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business,
whether this type of work is usually done by an employee,
skill required for the particular occupation,
who supplies the instruments and place of work,
length of time for which person is employed,
whether work is part of regular business of employer,
whether the parties believe they are creating the employer-employee relation, and
whether principal is in business.
3. Exceptions where employer is liable for independent contractor:
a) where employer retains control over the aspect of the activity in which the negligence occurs.
b) where the employer selects an incompetent contractor (includes no liability insurance or underfunded)
c) where the work performance involves inherently dangerous activity, e.g., blasting. (strict liability).
d) The duty, because of public policy considerations, is simply nondelegable, e.g., the duty of a business to keep its premises safe for customers; the duty of a motorist to keep his car in safe working order.
Liability for Negligent Selection
Both is respondeat superior and independent contractor situations, the employer may be liable for her own negligence is selecting an employee or contractor (e.g., a hospital is liable for contracting with physician who negligently treats hospital's patient). THIS IS NOT VICARIOUS LIABILITY.
D. NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES
1. A violation of a safety provision of the Vehicle Code does not make the violator strictly liable for damage caused by the violation. The duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain brakes so that they comply with the Vehicle Code cannot be delegated. MALONEY v. RATH (lady takes car in for repair of brakes, negligently installed, and involved in accident. Lady is REBUTTABLY PRESUMED LIABLE.)
Since her duty to maintain her brakes in compliance with the provisions of the Vehicle Code is nondelegable, the fact that the brake failure was the result of her independent contractor's negligence is no defense. MALONEY v. RATH
In the past, Maloney (victim) could not sue the mechanic directly, because he was not in privity of contract. Now under Third Party Beneficiary theory - could file negligence suit. Mechanic's failure to exercise due care caused the accident. By vicarious liability, could also sue Pete's Chevron. Maybe the personal assets of owner, depending on incorporation status.
Does is make any difference that she is not strictly liable? Yes, ruling still requires P put forth evidence of some negligence. If only strictly liable, P would not have to show violation of the reasonable person standard.
2. Duties that are nondelegable: 1) relationship where one party placed in care of another; 2) statutorily imposed duties; 3) involves enough danger / public safety (automobile without brakes).
E. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
1. Partnerships - Each member of a partnership or joint venture is vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of another member committed in the scope and course of the affairs of the partnership or joint venture. Can collect from partners' personal property
2. Limited Partnerships - limited partners can lose only their investment, as distinguished from general partners, above, who can lose personal possessions.
3. Corporations - stockholders only lose investment. Officers and directors may be personally liable.
F. OTHER FORMS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
1. Automobile Owner for Driver
The general rule is that an automobile owner is not vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of another driving his automobile. However, many jurisdictions have adopted the family car doctrine, which makes the owner liable for tortious conduct by immediate family members in driving with the owner's express or implied permission for a family purpose. Some states have passed "permissive use" statutes, which extend vicarious liability beyond family members to anyone who is driving with express or implied consent of owner. Also, if owner is in the car. Omnibus insurance clause - courts are willing to impose liability.
2. Negligent Entrustment
The owner may be liable for her own negligence in entrusting the car to a (drunk, reckless) driver. THIS IS NOT VICARIOUS LIABILITY.
3. Driver of a car is not vicariously liable for negligence of manufacturer.
4. If two cars are involved in an accident and neither is negligent (e.g., a stroke victim), then cannot collect.
III. STRICT LIABILITY
To establish a prima facie case for strict liability, the following elements must be shown: 1) the existence of an absolute duty on D to make safe; 2) breach of that duty; 3) breach was the actual and proximate cause of P's injury; 4) Damage to P's person or property.
Challenge: figure out when fault (negligence) should be required vs. strict liability. Choice affects how damages are assigned between competing innocent parties.
A. ANIMALS
1. Private party who harbors a wild animal, which by its very nature is vicious and unpredictable, does so at his peril, and liability for injuries inflicted by such animal is absolute. Denver v. Kennedy (? as long as the person injured did nothing, voluntarily or consciously, to bring about the injury - provocation)
2. PUBLIC POLICY: Where a municipality maintains and operates a zoo for the benefit of the public and in response to the public's obvious desires, keeping and displaying animals commonly wild in nature is not an unreasonable or unjustified act. Denver v. Kennedy Public Duty Exception - negligence must be shown, although a high degree of care will be required.
3. Where animals kept for display to the public by a city are of a dangerous propensity, there is a duty on the part of the City to protect the public from unreasonable risk of harm which might be caused by such animals. Kennedy v. Denver (girl gets finger bitten off by zebra, and city breached duty of care owed to girl to allow her by erecting barrier which she could easily reach over to come into contact with the zebras.) Liable only with fault/negligence, not strictly liable.
4. Domesticated (Nondangerous) Animals - Knowledge Required.
The owner of a domestic or inherently nondangerous animal (e.g., a dog or cat) is not strictly liable for injuries it causes. Strict liability attaches if owner has knowledge of that particular animal's dangerous propensities (i.e., propensities more dangerous than normal for that species, animal threatens serious bodily harm or property damage to others). This rule applies even if the animal has not actually injured anyone yet.
Exception: Some states have "dog bite" statutes, applicable only to dogs, which impose strict liability in personal injury actions even without prior knowledge of dangerous characteristics. Basically, these statutes reverse the common law rule that every dog was entitled to one bite before it became known to be an animal with dangerous propensities. The statutes make its keeper liable for all damage or harm caused by the animal, unless the P was a trespasser, or was committing a tort.
5. Licensees and Invitees - Landowner strictly liable.
6. Trespassers Must Prove Negligence - exception for vicious watchdogs
7. Trespassing Animals. The general rule is that the owner of animals that are likely to stray and that do stray onto the land of another is strictly liable for any damage caused by such animals. An exception to this rule was made for domestic pets. Some (agriculture) jurisdictions - fencing in requirement; some (livestock) jurisdictions - fencing out.
8. Damages flow from dangerous propensity of animal. Would include actual medical out-of-pocket expenses, pain and suffering, lost wages, ? missed vacation plans - debatable.
B. ULTRAHAZARDOUS OR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
1. Definition - An activity may be characterized as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous if it involves (1) a substantial risk of serious harm to person or property (2) no matter how much care is exercised. (3) Also, cannot be common usage. Strict liability is imposed on those who engage in such activities. Whether an activity is ultrahazardous is a question of law that the court can decide on a motion for directed verdict.
2. Test - The courts generally impose three requirements in finding an activity to be ultrahazardous:
(i) the activity must involve a risk of serious harm to persons or property.
(ii) The activity must be one that cannot be performed without risk of serious harm no matter how much care is taken.
(iii) It must not be a commonly engaged in activity by persons in the community. Example: In RYLANDS v. FLETCHER (1868), the House of Lords held a mill owner strictly liable when a neighbor's mines were flooded by water escaping from the mill owner's reservoir. This was considered an abnormal use in "mining country." (Other examples include blasting, manufacturing explosives, crop dusting, and fumigating).
The minority of courts that follow the R2T approach also take into account the value of the activity and the appropriateness of the location.
3. The rule of RYLANDS is that one is strictly liable to adjacent landowners when he brings an artificial and unnatural device (reservoir) onto his land, and the unnatural device causes something to escape from the land and harm another's land or property.
Blackstone emphasized damage caused by escaping forces. Cairns emphasized non-natural uses.
If the water had accumulated naturally and run off onto adjoining land, there could be no complaint. But here, D had constructed an artificial reservoir, which burst and flooded P's coal mines.
This case is distinguishable from traffic and other cases that require proof of a D's negligence for recovery. They involve situations where people have subjected themselves to some inevitable risk. Here, there is no ground for saying that P took upon himself any risk arising from the use to which D chose to put his land.
Why need strict liability for RYLANDS: 1) did not know about caves, not foreseeable. 2) hired competent contractor. 3) no vicarious liability for acts of independent contractor. 4) concept of nondelegable duty (to build reservoir in safe manner) did not exist yet.
Why no sue indep. contractor directly? Not in privity of contract.
When damage is done to personal property or even to the person - there must be fault/negligence for liability.
4. Strict liability is appropriate for injuries caused by blasting, where Ds blast a tree on D's property, and the explosion throws a piece of wood onto a highway killing a woman. The deceased's right to safety is greater than D's property right. P's injuries arose directly from D's activity. Strict liability is imposed even for employers of independent contractors. SULLIVAN v. DUNHAM
Activity is taking place on their property and for their benefit, therefore they must bear the loss vis-a-vis an innocent third party. Species of vicarious liability here, nondelegable duty. Here we have damage from direct result, not indirect result (concussion) so no proximate cause issue. If damage from concussion, then negligence must be proven.
nondelegable duty for safe blasting.
5. If you store explosives, then you are strictly liable for any damages. Even where thieves break in and deliberately set off explosives, the owner of the business storing the explosives - even though without fault, rather than the injured third party, should bear the loss. The use involved here was an abnormally dangerous one. The court felt that breaking and entering by thieves was foreseeable to owner, since thieves had previously broken into the warehouse - owner on notice. Proximate cause solved. YUKON EQUIPMENT v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.
We do not believe the Restatement (Second) should be used in cases involving explosives. Why is Court reluctant to conclude this activity is not abnormally dangerous?
The court, not a jury, should decide whether the activity is abnormally dangerous - mixed fact and law decision, concern jury might get carried away.
The R2T factors suggest a negligence (reasonable person) standard that may well be necessary where damage is caused by unique hazards and the question is whether the general rule of absolute liability applies. Do not want to use negligence concept.
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas - be good to your neighbor, use property so as not to harm others.
strict liability would still apply if the act was done negligently, accidentally, or recklessly. Without prior notice, strict liability would end with intentional acts by third parties - superseding acts.
6. The (First) Restatement allowed strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. Those were activities that were not of common usage and whose risks of serious harm could not be eliminated with utmost care.
The R2T allows strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. Rather than declaring the elements that must be met, the R2T proposes SIX factors to be balanced in deciding strict liability for ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES: We don't have to use all six. (1/6 rule)
1) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk.
2) Whether the gravity of that risk is high.
3) Whether the risk can be eliminated with reasonable care.
4) Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage.
5) Whether the activity is appropriate to the place where it is being carried out.
6) Whether the value to the community is outweighed by the danger.
7. There may be strict liability imposed for damage caused by products, depending on the theory used by a court in resolving such problems.
8. If strict liability, then D's proffer of "all due care" is irrelevant.
9. Why do we impose strict liability for reservoir and blasting, but not for steam boiler exploding (Losee v. Buchanan 1873)? Losee reasoning is that we have to externalize some of the costs or these enterprises would not take place in the first instance. If steamboiler had been operated negligently, then we would have liability. Here steamboiler is a "natural use."
C. EXTENT OF LIABILITY
1. Scope of Duty Owed
As contrasted with negligence, the duty owed is an absolute duty to make safe the animal, activity, or condition that is ultrahazardous, and liability will be imposed for any injuries to persons or property resulting therefrom.
a. To Whom is the Duty Owed?
In most states, the duty is owed only to "foreseeable plaintiffs" - persons to whom a reasonable person would have foreseen a risk of harm under the circumstances. (Generally, strict liability will not be imposed on a D's blasting that hurled rock onto a person so far away that no reasonable person would have foreseen a danger. However, some courts find liability for all blasting harm due to the intrinsic danger of D's activity).
b. Duty Limited to "Normally Dangerous Propensity"
The harm must result from the kind of danger to be anticipated from such dangerous animal or ultrahazardous activity, i.e., it must flow from the "normally dangerous propensity" of the condition or thing involved.
Example: D's toothless pet leopard escapes from its cage without fault on D's part and wanders into a park, causing P to break her arm while trying to flee. D is strictly liable to P.
Compare: D's gasoline tanker truck blows a tire without warning and hits Pedestrian. D is not strictly liable to Pedestrian. However, if the truck then crashed and exploded, and the explosion injured Bystander, D would be strictly liable to Bystander.
2. Proximate Cause
D's liability can be cut off by unforeseeable intervening forces.
3. DEFENSES
Contributory Negligence - no defense to strict liability unless P's negligence was the cause of the ultrahazardous activity.
Assumption of risk - this defense may be asserted against a P who voluntarily encounters a known danger and by his conduct expressly or impliedly consents to the risk of the danger.
Comparative negligence. Some courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions have been willing to reduce P's recovery to reflect the amount that his fault contributed to his injury.
Injury within the risk created. For strict liability to be imposed, the injury must have
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